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A Generic Framework for Three-Factor
Authentication: Preserving Security
and Privacy in Distributed Systems
Xinyi Huang, Yang Xiang, Member, IEEE, Ashley Chonka,
Jianying Zhou, and Robert H. Deng, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—As part of the security within distributed systems, various services and resources need protection from unauthorized use.
Remote authentication is the most commonly used method to determine the identity of a remote client. This paper investigates a
systematic approach for authenticating clients by three factors, namely password, smart card, and biometrics. A generic and secure
framework is proposed to upgrade two-factor authentication to three-factor authentication. The conversion not only significantly
improves the information assurance at low cost but also protects client privacy in distributed systems. In addition, our framework
retains several practice-friendly properties of the underlying two-factor authentication, which we believe is of independent interest.
Index Terms—Authentication, distributed systems, security, privacy, password, smart card, biometrics.
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
IN a distributed system, various resources are distributedin the form of network services provided and managed
by servers. Remote authentication is the most commonly
used method to determine the identity of a remote client. In
general, there are three authentication factors:
1. Something the client knows: password.
2. Something the client has: smart card.
3. Something the client is: biometric characteristics
(e.g., fingerprint, voiceprint, and iris scan).
Most early authentication mechanisms are solely based
on password. While such protocols are relatively easy to
implement, passwords (and human generated passwords in
particular) have many vulnerabilities. As an example,
human generated and memorable passwords are usually
short strings of characters and (sometimes) poorly selected.
By exploiting these vulnerabilities, simple dictionary
attacks can crack passwords in a short time [1]. Due to
these concerns, hardware authentication tokens are intro-
duced to strengthen the security in user authentication, and
smart-card-based password authentication has become one
of the most common authentication mechanisms.
Smart-card-based password authentication provides two-
factor authentication, namely a successful login requires the
client to have a valid smart card and a correct password.
While it provides stronger security guarantees than pass-
word authentication, it could also fail if both authentication
factors are compromised (e.g., an attacker has successfully
obtained the password and the data in the smart card). In
this case, a third authentication factor can alleviate the
problem and further improve the system’s assurance.
Another authentication mechanism is biometric authen-
tication [2], [3], [4], where users are identified by their
measurable human characteristics, such as fingerprint,
voiceprint, and iris scan. Biometric characteristics are
believed to be a reliable authentication factor since they
provide a potential source of high-entropy information and
cannot be easily lost or forgotten. Despite these merits,
biometric authentication has some imperfect features. Un-
like password, biometric characteristics cannot be easily
changed or revoked. Some biometric characteristics (e.g.,
fingerprint) can be easily obtained without the awareness of
the owner.1 This motivates the three-factor authentication,
which incorporates the advantages of the authentication
based on password, smart card, and biometrics.
1.1 Motivation
The motivation of this paper is to investigate a systematic
approach for the design of secure three-factor authentica-
tion with the protection of user privacy.
Three-factor authentication is introduced to incorporate
the advantages of the authentication based on password,
smart card, and biometrics. A well designed three-factor
authentication protocol can greatly improve the information
assurance in distributed systems. However, the previous
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1. Section 3.2 presents three other subtle issues in biometric authentica-
tion (especially in distributed systems).
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research on three-factor authentication is confusing and far
from satisfactory.
1.1.1 Security Issues
As we will show shortly (in Section 1.3), most existing three-
factor authentication protocols are flawed and cannot meet
security requirements in their applications. Even worse,
some improvements of those flawed protocols are not
secure either. The research history of three-factor authenti-
cation can be summarized in the following diagram.
NEW PROTOCOLS ! BROKEN ! IMPROVED
PROTOCOLS ! BROKEN AGAIN !    .
1.1.2 Privacy Issues
Along with the improved security features, three-factor
authentication also raises another subtle issue, namely how
to protect the biometric data. Not only is this the privacy
information of the owner, it is also closely related to the
security in the authentication. As biometrics cannot be
easily changed, the breached biometric information (either
on the server side or the client side) will make the
biometric authentication totally meaningless. However,
this issue has received less attention than it deserves from
protocol designers.
We believe it is worthwhile, both in theory and in
practice, to investigate a generic framework for three-factor
authentication, which can preserve the security and the
privacy in distributed systems.
1.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is a generic framework
for three-factor authentication in distributed systems. The
proposed framework has several merits as follows:
First, we demonstrate how to incorporate biometrics in
the existing authentication based on smart card and
password. Our framework is generic rather than instan-
tiated in the sense that it does not have any additional
requirements on the underlying smart-card-based pass-
word authentication. Not only will this simplify the design
and analysis of three-factor authentication protocols, but
also it will contribute a secure and generic upgrade from
two-factor authentication to three-factor authentication
possessing the practice-friendly properties of the under-
lying two-factor authentication system.
Second, authentication protocols in our framework can
provide true three-factor authentication, namely a success-
ful authentication requires password, smart card, and
biometric characteristics. In addition, our framework can
be easily adapted to allow the server to decide the
authentication factors in user authentication (instead of all
three authentication factors).
Last, in the proposed framework clients’ biometric
characteristics are kept secret from servers. This not only
protects user privacy but also prevents a single-point failure
(e.g., a breached server) from undermining the authentica-
tion level of other services. Furthermore, the verification of
all authentication factors is performed by the server. In
particular, our framework does not rely on any trusted
devices to verify the authentication factors, which also
meets the imperfect feature of distributed systems where
devices cannot be fully trusted.
1.3 Related Work
Several authentication protocols have been proposed to
integrate biometric authentication with password authenti-
cation and/or smart-card authentication. Lee et al. [5]
designed an authentication system which does not need a
password table to authenticate registered users. Instead,
smart card and fingerprint are required in the authentica-
tion. However, due to the analysis given in [6], Lee et al.’s
scheme is insecure under conspiring attack.
Lin and Lai [7] showed that Lee et al.’s scheme is
vulnerable to masquerade attack. Namely, a legitimate user
(i.e., a user who has registered on the system) is able to
make a successful login on behalf of other users. An
improved authentication protocol was given by Lin and Lai
to fix that flaw. The new protocol, however, has several
other security vulnerabilities. First, Lin-Lai’s scheme only
provides client authentication rather than mutual authenti-
cation, which makes it susceptible to the server spoofing
attack [8]. Second, the password changing phase in Lin-
Lai’s scheme is not secure as the smart card cannot check
the correctness of old passwords [9]. Third, Lin-Lai’s
scheme is insecure under impersonation attacks due to
the analysis given by Yoon and Yoo [10], who also proposed
a new scheme. However, the new scheme is broken and
improved by Lee and Kwon [11].
In [12], Kim et al. proposed two ID-based password
authentication schemes where users are authenticated by
smart cards, passwords, and fingerprints. However, Scott
[13] showed that a passive eavesdropper (without access to
any smart card, password or fingerprint) can successfully
login to the server on behalf of any claiming identity after
passively eavesdropping only one legitimate login.
Bhargav-Spantzel et al. proposed a privacy preserving
multifactor authentication protocol with biometrics [14].
The authentication server in their protocol does not have
the biometric information of registered clients. However,
the biometric authentication is implemented using zero
knowledge proofs [15], which requires the server to
maintain a database to store all users’ commitments and
uses costly modular exponentiations in the finite group.
In [16], Uludag et al. presented various methods of
binding a cryptographic keywith the biometric template of a
user stored in the database. The cryptographic key cannot be
revealed without a successful biometric authentication.
However, the biometric database could put client privacy
at risk. In order to protect client privacy, Fan and Lin [17]
proposed a three-factor authentication scheme with privacy
protection on biometrics. The essential approach of their
scheme is as follows: 1) During the registration, the client
chooses a random string and encrypts it using his/her
biometric template; 2) The result (called sketch) is stored in
the smart card; and 3) During the authentication, the client
must convince the server that he/she can decrypt the sketch,
which needs correct biometrics (close to the biometric
template in the registration). As we shall show shortly, our
framework employs a different approach. The client in our
framework uses his/her biometrics to generate a random
string. This leads to a generic three-factor authentication
protocol from smart-card-based password authentication.
Very recently, Li and Hwang [18] proposed another
biometric-based remote client authentication scheme using
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smart card and password. Our analysis, which will be given
shortly, points out two limitations of Li-Hwang’s scheme in
practical application. In addition, there are no satisfactory
solutions for three-factor authentication with additional
properties (e.g., key agreement with forward security),
which have been studied intensively in smart-card-based
password authentication.
Organization of this paper. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the
preliminaries of our framework. After that, we describe the
challenges of biometric authentication in distributed
systems in Section 3. The generic framework for three-
factor authentication is given in Section 4. Section 5
provides the analysis of the proposed framework, and its
formal security proofs are given in the supplementary file,
which can be found on the Computer Society Digital
Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2010.206. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section reviews the definitions of smart-card-based
password authentication, three-factor authentication, and
fuzzy extractor.
2.1 Smart-Card-Based Password Authentication
Definition 1. A smart-card-based password authentication
protocol (hereinafter referred to as SCPAP) consists of four
phases.
2-Factor-Initialization: The server (denoted by S) gen-
erates two system parameters PK and SK. PK is
published in the system, and SK is kept secret by S. An
execution of this algorithm is denoted by 2-Factor-
InitializationðÞ ! ðPK; SKÞ. Here,  is system’s security
parameter which determines the size of PK and SK, and
the security level of cryptographic algorithms.
2-Factor-Reg: The client (denoted by C), with an initial
password PW , registers on the system by running this
interactive protocol with S. The output of this protocol is a
smart card SC. An execution of this protocol is denoted by
The information in square brackets indicates the secret
value(s) known by the corresponding party. (The same
notation will be used in the remainder of this paper.)
2-Factor-Login-Auth: This is another interactive protocol
between the client and the server, which enables the client
to login successfully using PW and SC. An execution of
this protocol is denoted by
The output of this protocol is “1” (if the authentication is
successful) or “0” (otherwise).
2-Factor-Password-Changing: This protocol enables a
client to change his/her password after a successful
authentication (i.e., 2-Factor-Login-Auth outputs “1”). The
data in the smart card will be updated accordingly.
Security requirements. The attacker on SCPAP can be
classified from two aspects: the behavior of the attacker and
the information compromised by the attacker.
As an interactive protocol, SCPAP may face passive
attackers and active attackers.
Passive attacker. A passive attacker can obtain messages
transmitted between the client and the server. However, it
cannot interact with the client or the server.
Active attacker. An active attacker has the full control of
the communication channel. In addition to message eaves-
dropping, the attacker can arbitrarily inject, modify, and
delete messages in the communication between the client
and the server.
On the other hand, SCPAP is a two-factor authentication
protocol, namely a successful login requires a valid smart
card and a correct password. According to the compro-
mised secret, an attacker can be further classified into the
following two types.
Attacker with smart card. This type of attacker has the
smart card, and can read and modify the data in the smart
card. Notice that there are techniques to restrict access to
both reading and modifying data in the smart card.
Nevertheless, from the security point of view, authentica-
tion protocols will be more robust if they are secure against
attackers with the ability to do that.
Attacker with password. The attacker is assumed to have
the password of the client but is not given the smart card.
Definition 2 (Secure SCPAP). The basic security requirement
of SCPAP is that it should be secure against a passive attacker
with smart card and a passive attacker with password. It is
certainly more desirable that SCPAP is secure against an
active attacker with smart card and an active attacker with
password.
2.2 Three-Factor Authentication
Three-factor authentication is very similar to smart-card-
based password authentication, with the only difference
that it requires biometric characteristics as an additional
authentication factor.
Definition 3 (Three-Factor Authentication). A three-factor
authentication protocol involves a client C and a server S, and
consists of five phases.
3-Factor-Initialization: S generates two system para-
meters PK and SK. PK is published in the system, and
SK is kept secret by S. An execution of this algorithm is
denoted by 3-Factor-InitializationðÞ ! ðPK; SKÞ, where 
is system’s security parameter.
3-Factor-Reg: A client C, with an initial password PW
and biometric characteristics BioData, registers on the
system by running this interactive protocol with the server
S. The output of this protocol is a smart card SC, which is
given to C. An execution of this protocol is denoted by
3-Factor-Login-Auth: This is another interactive protocol
between the client C and the server S, which enables the
client to login successfully using PW , SC, and BioData. An
execution of this protocol is denoted by
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The output of this protocol is “1” (if the authentication is
successful) or “0” (otherwise).
3-Factor-Password-Changing: This protocol enables a
client to change his/her password after a successful
authentication. The data in the smart card will be updated
accordingly.
3-Factor-Biometrics-Changing2: An analogue of pass-
word-changing is biometrics-changing, namely the client
can change his/her biometrics used in the authentication,
e.g., using a different finger or using iris instead of finger.
While biometrics-changing is not supported by previous
three-factor authentication protocols, we believe it provides
the client with more flexibility in the authentication.
Cost effectiveness. In general, three-factor authentication
is less computationally efficient than smart-card-based pass-
word authentication, since the former requires additional
computational resources for biometric authentication. To
make three-factor authentication practical, biometric-related
operations must be performed fast and accurately. As
indicated in [16], the performance of extracting and
authenticating certain types of biometrics (e.g., face and
keystroke) is not satisfactory, but others (e.g., fingerprint and
iris) can satisfy practical requirements. (Examples include
fingerprint recognition in laptops and biometric visa.)
Security requirements. A three-factor authentication
protocol can also face passive attackers and active
attackers as defined in SCPAP (Section. 2.1). A passive
(an active) attacker can be further classified into the
following three types.
Type I attacker has the smart card and the biometric
characteristics of the client. It is not given the password of
that client.
Type II attacker has the password and the biometric
characteristics. It is not allowed to obtain the data in the
smart card.
Type III attacker has the smart card and the password of
the client. It is not given the biometric characteristics of that
client. Notice that such an attacker is free to mount any
attacks on the (unknown) biometrics, including biometrics
faking and attacks on the metadata (related to the
biometrics) stored in the smart card.
Definition 4 (Secure Three-Factor Authentication). For a
three-factor authentication protocol, the basic security require-
ment is that it should be secure against passive type I, type II,
and type III attackers. It is certainly more desirable that a
three-factor authentication protocol is secure against active type
I, type II, and type III attackers.
2.3 Fuzzy Extractor
This section briefly reviews the fuzzy extractor introduced
in [21].
2.3.1 Metric Space
A metric space is a set M with a distance function dis :
MM! IRþ ¼ ½0;1Þ which obeys various natural prop-
erties. One example of metric space is Hamming metric:M¼
Fn is over some alphabet F (e.g., F ¼ f0; 1g) and disðw;w0Þ
is the number of positions in which they differ.
2.3.2 Statistic Distance
The statistical distance between two probability distribu-
tions A and B is denoted by SDðA;BÞ ¼ 12
P
v jPrðA ¼ vÞ 
PrðB ¼ vÞj.
2.3.3 Entropy
The min-entropy H1ðAÞ of a random variable A is
 logðmaxa Pr½A ¼ aÞ.
2.3.4 Fuzzy Extractor
A fuzzy extractor extracts a nearly random string R from its
biometric input w in an error-tolerant way. If the input
changes but remains close, the extracted R remains the
same. To assist in recovering R from a biometric input w0, a
fuzzy extractor outputs an auxiliary string P . However, R
remains uniformly random even given P . The fuzzy
extractor is formally defined as below.
Definition 5 (Fuzzy Extractor). An ðM;m; ‘; t; Þ fuzzy
extractor is given by two procedures ðGen;RepÞ.
Gen is a probabilistic generation procedure, which on
(biometric) input w 2 M outputs an “extracted” string R 2
f0; 1g‘ and an auxiliary string P . For any distribution W on
M of min-entropy m, if <R;P> GenðW Þ, then we have
SDð<R;P>; <U‘; P>Þ  . Here, U‘ denotes the uniform
distribution on ‘-bit binary strings.
Rep is a deterministic reproduction procedure allowing to
recover R from the corresponding auxiliary string P and any
vector w0 close to w: for all w;w0 2 M satisfying
disðw;w0Þ  t, i f <R;P> GenðwÞ, then we have
Repðw0; P Þ ¼ R.
3 CHALLENGES IN BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
This section is devoted to a brief description of three subtle
issues in biometric authentication, namely privacy issues,
error tolerance, and nontrusted devices.
3.1 Privacy Issues
A trivial way to include biometric authentication in smart-
card-based password authentication is to scan the biometric
characteristics and store the extracted biometric data as a
template in the server. During the authentication, a compar-
ison is made between the stored data and the input biometric
data. If there is a sufficient commonality, a biometric
authentication is said to be successful. This method, how-
ever, will raise several security risks, especially in a multi-
server environmentwhere user privacy is a concern (e.g., in a
distributed system). First, servers are not 100 percent secure.
Servers with weak security protections can be broken in by
attackers,whowill obtain the biometric data on those servers.
Second, servers are not 100 percent trusted. Server-A
(equivalently, its curious administrator) could try to login
to Server-B on behalf of their common clients, or distribute
users’ biometric information in the system. In either case,
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2. This is motivated by the reviewer’s comment.
user privacy will be compromised, and a single-point failure
on a server will downgrade the whole system’s security level
from three-factor authentication to two-factor authentication
(since clients are likely to register the same biometric
characteristics on all servers in the system).
Notice that there is a potential solution to preserve user
privacy even the server has a copy of clients’ biometric data.
Themethod is called “cancellable biometrics” [22]: Biometric
data can be intentionally distorted in a repeatable manner.
This allows the client to generate different biometrics for
different purposes and register different biometric data on
different servers. Furthermore, the client can cancel his/her
biometric data on the server and enroll a new one whenever
necessary (e.g., if the biometric data stored on the server is
compromised). However, cancellable biometrics has certain
limitations [23]. To date, there are generally two methods to
implement cancellable biometrics: 1) Biometric Salting and
2) Noninvertible Transforms. The former method needs an
auxiliary data which must be kept secret, and it remains as a
challenging work to design a noninvertible transform
function satisfying both performance and noninvertibility
requirements. Due to these concerns, our framework does
not use cancellable biometrics.
3.2 Error Tolerance and Nontrusted Devices
One challenge in biometric authentication is that biometric
characteristics are prone to various noise during data
collecting, and this natural feature makes it impossible to
reproduce precisely each time biometric characteristics are
measured. A practical biometric authentication protocol
cannot simply compare the hash or the encryption of
biometric templates (which requires an exact match).
Instead, biometric authentication must tolerate failures
within a reasonable bound. Another issue in biometric
authentication is that the verification of biometrics should
be performed by the server instead of other devices, since
such devices are usually remotely located from the server
and cannot be fully trusted. The above two subtle issues
seem to be neglected in a recent three-factor authentication
protocol proposed by Li and Hwang [18]. The detailed
analysis of their protocol is given in the supplementary file
(Section 1), which can be found on the Computer Society
Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/
10.1109/TPDS.2010.206.
4 A GENERIC FRAMEWORK FOR THREE-FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION
This section describes a generic approach for three-factor
authentication from a smart-card-based password authen-
tication protocol (SCPAP, Definition 1) and a fuzzy
extractor (Definition 5). The design philosophy of our
approach can be found in the supplementary file (Section 2),
which can be found on the Computer Society Digital
Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2010.206, where a graphical representation (Fig. 1) is
given to illustrate the three-factor authentication process.
4.1 3-Factor-Initialization
We first describe the initialization phase in the proposed
framework. This phase generates a public parameter and a
secret parameter for three-factor authentication. Let 2-
Factor-Initialization be the initialization algorithm in the
underlying SCPAP. Given a security parameter , the
authentication server S in our framework runs 2-Factor-
Initialization twice:
1. 2-Factor-InitializationðÞ ! ðPK1; SK1Þ.
2. 2-Factor-InitializationðÞ ! ðPK2; SK2Þ.
Notice that the two pairs ðPK1; SK1Þ and ðPK2; SK2Þ are
generated in an independent manner.
The public parameter in three-factor authentication is the
pair ðPK1; PK2Þ, and the corresponding secret parameter is
the pair ðSK1; SK2Þ.
4.2 3-Factor-Reg
The registration in our framework is made up of the
following steps. In the following, let h be a cryptographic
hash function chosen by the client C.
1. An initial password PW1 is chosen by the client C.
2. GenðBioDataÞ ! ðR; P Þ. A pair ðR;P Þ is generated
using C’s biometric template BioData and the
algorithm Gen in the fuzzy extractor. We assume
there is a device extracting the biometric template
and carrying out all calculations in the fuzzy
extractor. Notice that this step does not involve
any interaction with the authentication server.
3. Let PW2 ¼ hðRÞ. The second “password” PW2 is
calculated from the random string R. R will be
deleted immediately once the calculation of PW2 is
complete.
4.
C (using PW1) and S (using SK1) first execute the 2-
Factor-Reg protocol of SCPAP. Let Data1 be the data
generated by S at this step.
5.
C and S have another run of 2-Factor-Reg protocol,
where C registers PW2 and S uses SK2 to generate the
corresponding data Data2. PW2 will be deleted
immediately once the registration is complete.
6. S generates a smart card SC which contains Data1
and Data2. The client C is given SC.
7. C updates the data in the smart card SC by adding
Data3 ¼ fthe auxiliary string P , the description of the
hash function h, the reproduction algorithm Rep}.
This completes the description of the 3-Factor-Reg protocol
in our framework. As in the existing authentication
protocols, we assume the registration phase is performed
in a secure and reliable environment, and particularly the
device at Step 2 is trusted for its purpose. After a successful
registration, the client C will have a smart card SC (contains
fData1;Data2;Data3g). The initial password is PW1. Notice
that neither the server nor the smart card has a copy of
client’s biometric characteristics.
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4.3 3-Factor-Login-Auth
The client C first inserts the smart card SC into a card
reader, which will extract the data fData1;Data2;Data3g.
(Recall that Data3 ¼ ðP; h;RepÞ.) After that, C inputs the
password PW1 and his/her biometric data.
3 Let BioData0
be the biometric template extracted at this phase. The login
is made up of the following three steps.
1. Calculate R ¼ RepðBioData0; P Þ and PW2 ¼ hðRÞ. A
random string R is calculated from the biometric
template BioData0 and the auxiliary string P (which
is stored in the smart card) by running the algorithm
Rep. The random string R will be the same as the
one generated at the registration phase if BioData0 is
close to BioData. More precisely, one can obtain an
identical R if disðBioData; BioData0Þ < t in an
ðM;m; ‘; t; Þ fuzzy extractor (Definition 5).
2.
C (using PW1 and Data1) and S (using SK1) first
execute the 2-Factor-Login-Auth protocol of SCPAP.
3.
C and S have another run of 2-Factor-Login-Auth,
where C uses PW2 and Data2, and S uses SK2.
This completes the description of the 3-Factor-Login-
Auth protocol in our framework. The protocol outputs “1” if
and only if both executions of 2-Factor-Login-Auth protocol
output “1.” Otherwise, the protocol outputs “0.”
Remark. In order to make the protocol clear, we separate the
authentication by two steps (Step 2 and Step 3). This also
shows the flexibility of our protocol: According to the
criticality of the requested service, the service provider
(i.e., the serverS in our protocol) can determine the factors
used in the authentication. Namely, the service provider
can authenticate the client based on “smart card and
password” (Step 2), “smart card and biometrics” (Step 1
and Step 3), or “smart card, password, and biometrics”
(Steps 1-3). In the case of all three factors are required,
client and server can carry out the authentication more
efficiently. Let fM1;R1;M2;R2; . . . ;Mn;Rng be a tran-
script of the authentication at Step 2, and let fM01;R01;
M02;R02; . . . ;M0n;R0ng be that at Step 3.
4.4 3-Factor-Password-Changing
After a successful login (i.e., 3-Factor-Login-Auth outputs
“1”), the client and the server can execute2-Factor-Password-
ChangingofSCPAP to change thepasswordPW1 toPW
0
1 and
update the data in the smart card accordingly.
4.5 3-Factor-Biometrics-Changing
Similarly, one can change the biometrics used in the
authentication. To do that, the client can generate a new
“password” PW 02 (determined by the new biometrics) by
running Step 2-3 in the registration phase. After that, the
client and the server can execute 2-Factor-Password-
Changing of SCPAP to change PW2 to PW
0
2 and update
the data in the smart card accordingly. As in the
registration, PW 02 will be deleted immediately once this
phase is complete.
5 SCHEME ANALYSIS
This section is devoted to the analysis of the generic
framework.
5.1 Security Analysis
In the supplementary file (Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3),
which can be found on the Computer Society Digital
Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2010.206, we show that the generic construction
satisfies all security requirements of three-factor authenti-
cation, if the underlying SCPAP satisfies Definition 2 and
the fuzzy extractor satisfies Definition 5. Other security
properties of the proposed framework are also investi-
gated in the supplementary file (Section 3.4), which can
be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at
http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.
2010.206.
5.2 Comparison with Previous Protocols
The purpose of this paper is to investigate a systematic
approach for the design of secure three-factor authentica-
tion. Thus, like almost all generic constructions, our
framework does not have advantages from the computa-
tional point of view. Nevertheless, it is still affordable for
smart-card applications, due to the efficient designs of
SCPAP and fuzzy extractor: There are a number of efficient
SCPAPs in the literature, and fuzzy extractors can be
constructed from error-correcting code and standard pair-
wise-independent hashing [21], both of which require only
lightweight operations. In addition, the proposed frame-
work enjoys several desirable properties of SCPAP. This
saves the time and effort on the design of three-factor
authentication with those properties, and more importantly
avoids the confusing “broken and improved” process in the
existing research on three-factor authentication.
6 CONCLUSION
Preserving security and privacy is a challenging issue in
distributed systems. This paper makes a step forward in
solving this issue by proposing a generic framework for
three-factor authentication to protect services and resources
from unauthorized use. The authentication is based on
password, smart card, and biometrics. Our framework not
only demonstrates how to obtain secure three-factor
authentication from two-factor authentication, but also
addresses several prominent issues of biometric authentica-
tion in distributed systems (e.g., client privacy and error
tolerance). The analysis shows that the framework satisfies
all security requirements on three-factor authentication and
has several other practice-friendly properties (e.g., key
agreement, forward security, and mutual authentication).
The future work is to fully identify the practical threats on
three-factor authentication and develop concrete three-
factor authentication protocols with better performances.
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3. The biometric extractor is trusted to extract biometrics properly and
never divulges the biometric information. This is a weaker assumption than
using a fully trusted device to verify biometrics.
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